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I. INTRODUCTION
Article II's Advice and Consent Clause provides a seemingly unqualified
method for appointing federal officials: the president "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," appoint federal judges and
other officers of the United States. However, the very next clause, known as
the Recess Appointments Clause ("the Clause"), quickly curtails this otherwise
absolute mandate. It states that, "The President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by ,ranting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." This
contemplates no role for the Senate in approving temporary commissions that
+ Law Clerk to the Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. B.A., Rutgers University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School. Special
gratitude is owed to Professor Jason Mazzone for his time, revisions, and recommendations.
Also, thanks to Monica Asher and Peter Plevritis for their critiques of drafts.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The only "judges" that the Advice and Consent Clause
specifically references are "judges of the Supreme Court." Id. "Officers of the United States"
has been read to include federal judges of inferior courts. See infra note 9. The appointment
process "serves as one means by which the Framers 'textually committed the nation to checks and
balances,' and-particularly in the case of judicial appointments-serves to protect individual
rights and liberties through a constitutional structure that resists individual 'encroachments' and
'majoritarian impulses."' Matthew Madden, Note, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power
to Nominate, 93 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1144 (2007) (quoting Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of
Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV.
1079, 1082 (1988) (footnote omitted)).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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"happen during the Recess of the Senate." 3  On its face, the Recess
Appointments Clause leaves all power and discretion solely in the hands of the
president. The question becomes: how do we reconcile these two clauses?
Does the Recess Appointments Clause always trump the Advice and Consent
Clause? The problem is that the Recess Appointments Clause is broad and
indefinite in scope. The lack of clarity and specificity explains why the Recess
Appointments Clause has been described as "a single, vague text [that] applies
in quite different settings."4 The Clause's vagueness and the often unsettling
ramifications accompanying its use demonstrate that debates over the Clause
cannot be settled by textual analysis alone. Instead, to find the proper
interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause, we may need to look
beyond its text to the reasons that the Framers drafted it in the first place.5
The Recess Appointments Clause is somewhat of an anamoly. It was
adopted by the Continental Congress without debate. 6 Further, the Federalist
Papers and other documents contemporaneous to the Constitution's ratification
fail to discuss the Clause in depth. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 67,
does, however, provide two minor clues to the Recess Appointments Clause's
intended reach. First, he explains that the word "officers" was intended to
refer to the positions described in the Advice and Consent Clause.9 Second, he
lays out the purpose behind the Clause:
3. Id.; see also Jeannine R. Reardon, Selecting Supreme Court Justices: Preserving the
System, Protecting with Professionalism, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 861, 870-71 (2007) (stating that
the president may make an appointment without Senate approval if Congress is not in session).
4. Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and
Others), 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 453 (2005).
5. In his article, Professor Herz points out that "[t]he inquiry changes from one about
'purpose' to one about 'policy."' ld at 457.
6. Louis Fisher, Recess Appointments of Federal Judges, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 125, 126 (Steven C. Caldwell ed., 2002) [hereinafter Fisher, Recess
Appointments]; Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to
Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary
Blueprint for Remodeling Our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate System of
Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 552 (1996); Thomas A. Curtis, Note,
Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional
Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1768 (1984) ("The clause was proposed late in the
convention, on the same day that the delegates finally agreed to vest the general appointments
power in the President with approval by the Senate. The clause passed without objection or
recorded debate." (footnote omitted)).
7. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Norris, J.,
dissenting); Herz, supra note 4, at 444 n.4.
8. The United States Supreme Court has noted that the Federalist Papers are "great
authority" and provide a "complete commentary on our constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
9. Alexander Hamilton explains that the Recess Appointments Clause was not intended to
apply to vacancies in the Senate. In doing so, he concludes that the word "officers" refers to
those described in the preceding clause. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961) ("If this clause is to be considered as supplementary to the one which
[Vol. 58:751
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The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and
Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the session
of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige this body
to be continually in session for the appointment of offices; and as
vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be necessary
for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause [the
Recess Appointments Clause] is evidently intended to authorise the
President singly to make temporary appointments .... 1
Hamilton's analysis, by focusing on positions "which it might be necessary for
the public service to fill without delay," emphasizes the notion of urgency,
which was undoubtedly of concern to the Framers.1 For example, if during
wartime the Senate was in recess and the secretary of defense died, it would be
"necessary for the public service" to fill this position without delay. In
approving the Clause, the Framers recognized that this type of extreme
situation would warrant circumventing the traditional advice and consent
requirements in favor of expediency and national security.1 2 Unfortunately,
not all recess appointments have been such clear-cut cases.' Because the
Continental Congress and Federalist Papers do not provide further explanation
as to the Framers' understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause, textual
analysis of this provision has resulted in heated debate. The Clause has been
the source of litigation, scholarly analysis, and congressional action.'
4
In particular, three main textual issues have arisen with regard to the Recess
Appointments Clause. First, what counts as "the Recess of the Senate"?
5
Some commentators conclude that "the Recess" only refers to the Senate's
precedes, the vacancies of which it speaks must be construed to relate to the 'officers' described
in the preceding one; and this we have seen excludes from its description the members of the
Senate."); see also Arthur Ago, Comment, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Procedure, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
544, 585 (1997).
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 67 (Hamilton), supra note 9, at 455.
11. Id.; see Herz, supra note 4, at 445-46 (attacking articles that focus on when the vacancy
arose by examining the purpose of the clause). Herz argues that "if the president needs to make
an appointment, and the Senate is not around, when the vacancy arose hardly matters; the point is
that it must be filled now." Id.
12. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631, 633 (1823); Curtis, supra note 6, at 1768.
13. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1221-27 (11 th Cir. 2004) (involving the
appointment of Judge Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals). Judge Pryor had
previously been nominated to the federal judiciary by President George W. Bush, but because of
procedural maneuvering, the Senate never gave an up or down vote. See Michael A. Fletcher &
Helen Dewar, Bush Will Renominate 20 Judges, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at A5. A vacancy
arose before a recess of the Senate and, nine days into the recess, the President used his recess
appointment power to appoint Judge Pryor. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1221. See infra notes 166-70 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Evans.
14. See infra notes 15-41, 166-93 and accompanying text.
15. See Fisher, Recess Appointments, supra note 6, at 127; Edward A. Hartnett, Recess
Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 377,
408 (2005).
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intersession recess, which is the break between two sessions of the Senate. 16
They argue that use of the word "the" implies a singular connotation. 17 Thus,
there can only be only one recess per session of the Senate.' 8 Others assert that
if the Framers wanted to limit the scope of the Clause in such a manner, they
would have expressly done so.' 9 They contend that "Recess" refers to both the
intersession recess and intrasession recesses, which are adjournments made
during a given session of the Senate. 20  They cling to the congressional
definition of "Recess" as any break in session for longer than three days.
2
'
This interpretation includes long weekends, such as holiday breaks for
Memorial Day and Independence Day, in the definition of "Recess.' 22 To
date, this argument has prevailed. Many presidents, starting with Andrew
23Johnson, have made intrasession recess appointments, and several courts
have upheld decisions drafted by judges serving as intrasession recess
appointees.
24
The second controversy involving the text of the Recess Appointments
Clause relates to the meaning of "Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate. 25 For example, if a cabinet official dies during a session
of the Senate, but no one is confirmed before the Senate's next recess, may the
president use the recess appointment power to fill the vacancy? Some argue
16. See Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for the Purposes of the
Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2218-19 (1994).
17. See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1228 n.2 (Barkett, J., dissenting); 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 599, 600-01
(1901); Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An Unconstitutional
Transformation of Senate Advice and Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 90-91 (2006).
18. Carrier, supra note 16, at 2218-19.
19. Seth Barrett Tillman, Senate Termination of Presidential Recess Appointments, 101 Nw.
U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 82, 84-85 (2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/Colloquy/2007/2/LRColl2007n2Tillman.pdf.
20. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 424.
21. See Paul Kane, Senate Stays in Session to Block Recess Appointments, WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, 2007, at A4 ("Congressional rules allow for the Senate to be adjourned for three full
days without being considered in recess.").
22. See id
23. Carrier, supra note 16, at 2211; see also Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess
Appointments to Article III Courts, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 656, 670 tbl. 1 (2004) (identifying
"Recess Appointments to Article III courts during intrasession Senate recesses").
24. E.g., Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1221-22, 1227 (1 1th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d
704, 715 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 117 (N.D. Ga. 1880).
25. See Ago, supra note 9, at 585-86 ("[T]he issue that has most frequently arisen under the
Clause is when a 'vacancy' arises."). For an interesting discussion of when a vacancy "happens"
in the event of a contingent retirement (that is, a judge retiring only upon the occurrence of a
specified event-generally the nomination or confirmation of a successor), see Madden, supra
note 1, at 1155-72.
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that "happen" should be read to mean "arise."26 Under such an interpretation,
the vacancy did not "happen" during the recess, and thus cannot be filled
absent the Senate's advice and consent. 27 Others have argued that the timing
of the vacancy's creation is immaterial because in either case it is equally
important that the position be filled.28  Much like in the debate over the
meaning of "the Recess," courts and the executive branch have sided with the
broad construction of "happen," so as to include vacancies that exist, but did
29
not arise, during the recess of the Senate.
The last major controversy surrounding the text of the Recess Appointments
Clause is whether it applies to vacancies in Article III courts at all. 30 Article
III provides federal judges with lifetime tenure, which they hold "during good
Behaviour," and salary, which "shall not be diminished" during their time in
office. 31 Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist 79 that the Framers'
purpose in providing for lifetime tenure and salary was to shield the judiciary
32from political influence. Those opposing application of the Recess
Appointments Clause to vacancies in the federal judiciary argue that the tenure
and salary provisions, found further along in the Constitution than the Recess
Appointments Clause, serve as implied limitations on the Clause's scope.
33
Lifetime tenure requirements are directly at odds with the temporary
commissions contemplated by the Recess Appointments Clause. 34 Thus, the
"Vacancies" in the Recess Appointments Clause do not include Article III
26. See, e.g., William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 515, 543-44 (2004); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the
Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1501-03 (2005).
27. Rappaport, supra note 26, at 1502-03.
28. See, e.g., 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631, 631-32 (1823); Herz, supra note 4, at 445-46.
29. See, e.g., Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1012-13; Allocco, 305 F.2d at 712; In re Farrow, 3 F. at
113-16; 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 525, 528 (1832); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631, 631-32 (1823).
30. See Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1010-11; LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL
RECESS JUDGES 3 (2005), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf
/RS22039.pdf [hereinafter FISHER, FEDERAL RECESS JUDGES].
31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
32. Hamilton explained the policy as follows:
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the
president, is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, a power
over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can never hope to
see realised in practice the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative
power, in any system, which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on
the occasional grants of the latter.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Hamilton), supra note 9, at 531 (footnote omitted); see also Reardon,
supra note 3, at 867.
33. See Paul Ferris Soloman, Comment, Answering the Unasked Question: Can Recess
Appointees Constitutionally Exercise the Judicial Power of the United States?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
631, 633-34, 646-47 (1985).
34. Curtis, supra note 6, at 1758; Soloman, supra note 33, at 638.
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positions.3 5 Conversely, there are those who argue that Article III positions
can be filled by recess appointees. 36 They point to Federalist 67's explanation
that the "Vacancies" in the Recess Appointments Clause refer to those of the
"officers" descibed in the Advice and Consent Clause.37  Because
appointments to permanent federal judgeships are typically subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate, these offices can also be filled by use of
recess appointments. 38  Further, courts and commentators note that nearly
every president, since the days of George Washington, has used the Recess
Appointments Clause to fill vacancies in Article III courts.3 9  Thus, they
contend that presidents close in time to the ratification of the Constitution
understood the Clause to apply to vacancies in the federal judiciary. As with
the other two debates, the expansive view has prevailed. Courts have upheld
presidential power to make recess appointments to Article III positions.4'
There are recurring problems with all of the textual arguments advocating a
narrower interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause. In effect, finding
that the Clause has been improperly construed by past presidents and courts
necessitates a conclusion that multiple presidents have unconstitutionally
appointed federal judges.4 2 Further, accepting such textual arguments would
cast doubt on the legitimacy of rulings that have been issued by judges over the
course of the past two centuries.43 Such dramatic consequences have caused
35. See Soloman, supra note 33, at 646-47.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 705, 715 (2d Cir. 1962); Curtis, supra
note 6, at 1769-70.
37. See Curtis, supra note 6, at 1769-70.
38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton), supra note 9, at 522 ("As to the mode of
appointing the judges: This is the same with that of appointing the officers of the union in general
..... ); see also Allocco, 305 F.2d at 708-09.
39. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Herz,
supra note 4, at 449; Curtis, supra note 6, at 1773; Madden, supra note 1, at 1170.
40. Curtis, supra note 6, at 1776 (referring to the presidential practice of George
Washington as "'contemporaneous and weighty evidence of [the] true meaning' of the recess
appointments clause" (alteration in original) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790
(1983))).
41. E.g., Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1011.
42. Hartnett, supra note 15, at 428 ("To conclude that recess appointments to Article III
courts are unconstitutional would mean that every one of those presidents violated the'
constitution."); Herz, supra note 4, at 449 ("[P]residents going back to George Washington have
made over 300 recess appointments to Article III courts. It is hard to find anyone-other than
losing litigants or bitter senators-who argues that recess appointments of Article III judges are
unconstitutional per se." (footnotes omitted)).
43. See Hartnett, supra note 15, at 428-29 (explaining that accepting such arguments
"would also mean that every one of those judges did [violate the Constitution] as well-not in the
way they decided a particular case-but in exercising judicial power in the first place, indeed at
the very moment that they took their oath to 'faithfully and impartially' discharge their duties").
[Vol. 58:751
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courts and many commentators to interpret the Clause expansively, in a
manner that is in line with the traditional presidential understanding.
4 4
This Article is limited to the topic of appointments to Article III courts and
focuses on the unique characteristics of the contemporary federal judiciary. It
argues that the Recess Appointments Clause should not be used to fill
vacancies on Article III courts because, when considered in the context of the
contemporary federal judiciary, the purposes underlying the Clause's
ratification are no longer met. My analysis is not a text-based argument, and
thus does not yield the unsettling ramifications described above. Unlike a
textual approach, this Article advocates a "living Constitution' '45 approach that
does not necessitate the conclusion that George Washington and his
presidential successors trampled on the Constitution. It simply recognizes that
changes in the size and structure of the federal judiciary, technology, and
recent events require an evolving view of the Recess Appointments Clause.46
In doing so, this Article looks to the purpose, rather than the broad text, of the
Recess Appointments Clause, and asks whether the Clause's goals are still met
by its contemporary application to the federal judiciary. It concludes that the
differences between today's judiciary and the judiciary that existed early in our
nation's history necessitate a new consideration of the Recess Appointments
Clause's scope that forbids its use to fill Article III vacancies. Thus, it seeks to
provide a new interpretation heading into the future, rather than one
challenging recess appointments by past presidents.
Part II of this Article begins by discussing the size, composition, and
structure of the early federal judiciary. Part III then contrasts these attributes
with those of the twenty-first century judiciary. Next, Part IV examines the
purpose behind the Recess Appointments Clause, and concludes that in
drafting it, the Framers were primarily concerned with the public interest and
the smooth functioning of the judiciary. It then discusses whether these
functions are still served by recess appointments to Article III courts. Part V
analyzes recent events, such as the Senate's "faux sessions ' 47 that were
convened during the Thanksgiving and Winter Breaks in 2007 to prevent
44. See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (i Ith Cir. 2004); Woodley, 751 F.2d at
1009-11; United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Farrow, 3 F. 112,
115-16 (N.D. Ga. 1880); Hartnett, supra note 15, at 424.
45. For a detailed discussion of the "living Constitution" and its key proponent, Justice
Black, see Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV.
673 (1963).
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See Kane, supra note 21 ("Reid employed a rarely used parliamentary tactic by
scheduling 'pro forma' sessions twice a week until early December .... ); Noam N. Levey, The
Senate Isn't Exactly Out of Town, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at A20 ("The expected faux
sessions will be part of a rare gambit by [Reid] to prevent President Bush from making any so-
called recess appointments, as presidents sometimes do when a nomination is in trouble in the
Senate.").
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
President George W. Bush from using his recess appointment power.48 Part VI
concludes that these contemporary events, coupled with the structure of
today's federal judiciary, indicate that the policy behind the Recess
Appointments Clause is no longer met by using its powers to fill vacancies on
Article III courts. Thus, while it was at one time crucial to the effective
functioning of the federal judiciary, public policy is no longer furthered by
such a construction. Therefore, with the policy behind the Recess
Appointments Clause no longer served, the Clause should no longer be
interpreted to allow the president to fill vacancies in Article III courts.
II. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND STRUCTURE OF THE EARLY FEDERAL JUDICIARY
The federal judiciary envisioned by the Framers differs drastically from that
which we see today. Article III authorized the creation of a judiciary and set
forth basic jurisdictional limitations, but it did not affirmatively put in place a
federal judicial system.49 In fact, the Constitution only established that there
must be a Supreme Court, but that Congress could, at its discretion, "ordain
and establish" inferior federal courts. Congress did so with the Judiciary Act
of 1789.51 This Act was passed in the First Session of Congress and
established district and circuit courts, and set the number of justices on the
Supreme Court.
52
First, the Act provided that the Supreme Court was to consist of six Justices:
five associate Justices and one Chief Justice. 53 Next, it set forth the thirteen
judicial districts.54 Each of the eleven states received one district, except
Virginia and Massachusetts, which received two each.55 Each district was to
consist of only one district judge, which Congress mandated must hold four
sessions annually. 56 Congress granted original jurisdiction to these courts over
48. Kane, supra note 21 ("[Reid], in a showdown with the White House over executive
branch nominations, refused yesterday to formally adjourn the chamber for a planned two-week
Thanksgiving break in order to thwart President Bush's ability to make recess appointments.");
Levey, supra note 47 ("Reid asked a few Democratic senators who plan to be close to the capital
during the holidays ... to gavel open and shut the Senate for two days each week.").
49. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
51. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75.
52. Id. §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. at 73-75.
53. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 73.
54. Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 73.
55. Id. Virginia received one district that covered modem-day Virginia and West Virginia,
as well as one to cover modern-day Kentucky. Massachusetts's two districts were comprised of
modern-day Massachusetts and modem-day Maine. Edward A. Hartnett, Marbury at 200: A
Bicentennial Celebration ofMarbury v. Madison: Marbury's Errors?: Not the King's Bench, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 285 n.4 (2003); Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the
Vicinage and County-Line Criminal Buffer Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REv. 271, 303 n. 116 (2005).
56. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 3, 1 Stat. at 73-74.
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lesser offenses,57 and prohibited state courts from presiding over trials
involving federal criminal offenses, except as Congress authorized.58 Last, the
Act created three United States circuit courts.5 9 These courts encompassed the
eleven existing states and were divided into the eastern, middle, and southern
circuits. The Act mandated that the circuit courts convene twice annually.
61
The circuit courts were granted non-exclusive original jurisdiction over
controversies that involved more than five hundred dollars, 62 original
jurisdiction concurrent with the district courts in cases of more serious
crimes,63 and appellate jurisdiction over the district courts.6 4 However, unlike
with the district courts, the Act created no new judgeships to fill the circuit
courts.65 Instead, two Supreme Court Justices and one district court judge sat
on these panels, any two of whom would constitute a quorum. 66 Consequently,
no federal judges sat on just one court. Each district judge sat on his respective
district court, but also periodically convened in the circuit court to hear appeals
and try cases. 67 Similarly, Supreme Court Justices sat on the Supreme Court,but also "rode" the three circuits.68
57. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76-77 ("[T]he district courts(c) shall have.., cognizance.., where no
other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted .... "); see also
Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of
and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1545 (1986) (discussing
the extent ofjurisdiction of the federal courts as a result of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
58. Judiciary Act of1789 § 11, 1 Stat. at78-79.
59. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74.
60. The Maine and Kentucky districts were excluded from the circuits. Id.; DWIGHT F.
HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 23 (1971); Kalt, supra note 55, at 303 n. 116.
61. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 4, 1 Stat. at 74.
62. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78 ("[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent
with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature . . . where the matter in the
dispute exceeds ... five hundred dollars .... ").
63. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79 ("[Circuit courts] shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes
... except where this act otherwise provides .... and concurrent jurisdiction with the district
courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein.").
64. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 79 ("[T]he circuit courts shall also have appellate jurisdiction from
the district courts .... ").
65. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75.
66. Id Congress stated that no judge could vote on an appeal stemming from his own
decision. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 75.
67. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc
Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 221-22 (1999).
68. Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251,
278 (2005) ("Justices of the Supreme Court spent most of their time exercising original
jurisdiction that would have been forbidden to the Supreme Court itself. This is what circuit
riding involved, which is why both Chief Justice John Jay and Justice Samuel Chase questioned
its constitutionality."); see also Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and
the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2003).
2009]
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Many of the Framers were themselves members of the First Congress. 69
Because the First Congress enacted the statute establishing the first federal
judiciary, this legislation provides some key insight into what the Framers had
in mind when they drafted the Recess Appointments Clause.70 The structure of
the Judiciary Act indicates that they could not have envisioned the type of
federal judiciary that we have today, consisting of more than one thousand
71judges and thirteen circuits. Instead, the Framers put in place a system
consisting of only nineteen federal judges: six Supreme Court Justices and
72thirteen district judges. In such a system, the death or resignation of a single
federal judge could lead to a breakdown in the functioning of the judiciary. 73
Thus, the need for keeping these offices continually occupied was great. 74
The six Supreme Court Justices were spread thin, sitting on not only their
own Court, but convening on circuit panels across the country.75 Early federal
judges found their jobs to be stressful and many Supreme Court Justices spoke
76out about the burdens of circuit riding. In a 1792 letter to Congress, the
69. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174 (1926) ("[The initial] construction of the
Constitution [was] made by a Congress which was [composed of] a considerable number of those
who had been members of the Convention that framed the Constitution and presented it for
ratification. It was the Congress that launched the Government."); see also David B. Rivkin, Jr.,
The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM.U. 309, 311-12 (1993).
70. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 175; James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The views
and action of the first Congress . . . are entitled to considerable weight in cases like this of
constitutional interpretation."). But see Michael Bhargava, Comment, The First Congress Canon
and the Supreme Court's Use of History, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1745, 1747-49 (2006) (attacking the
use of the "First Congress canon" in ascertaining the Framers' intent).
71. For a detailed breakdown of the total number of federal judges between 1990 and 2006,
see U.S. Courts, Total Judicial Officers, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/
Table 101 .pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Total Judicial Officers Table].
72. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 73, 73; Charles W. Nihan, A Study in
Contrasts: The Ability of the Federal Judiciary to Change Its Adjudicative and Administrative
Structures, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1693, 1697 (1995).
73. See I Op. Att'y Gen. 631, 632 (1823) (stating that, in some cases, "the vacancy may
paralyze a whole line of action in some essential branch of our internal police").
74. See id. ("[T]he public interests may imperiously demand that it [the vacancy] shall be
immediately filled.").
75. Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1326 (2007)
(noting that circuit riding "imposed extreme hardships on Justices, especially in the first half of
the nineteenth century when long distance travel was so difficult and onerous"); John V. Orth,
John Marshall & "Debts Which Ought Never to Have Been Contracted, " 4 GREEN BAG 2D 49,
50 (2000) ("[C]ircuit riding was never easy for the elderly men typically appointed to the
Supreme Court. Even as transportation improved to make travel less difficult, the nation
expanded in size to make the distances to be covered ever greater.").
76. "The justices were unanimous in their objection to riding circuit." HENDERSON, supra
note 60, at 41. They argued both that it was too physically taxing and that they believed it to be
unconstitutional because it vested Justices of the Supreme Court, who are constitutionally
entrusted with appellate review, with the responsibility of presiding over trials. They contested
that, "except in two cases, the Constitution confined the supreme court, and consequently its
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Justices spoke of the rigors attending circuit court responsibilities and implored
Congress to remove the circuit-riding requirement:
[T]he task of holding twenty-seven circuit courts a year, in the
different States, from New Hampshire to Georgia, besides two
sessions of the Supreme Court at Philadelphia, in the two most
severe seasons of the year, is a task which, considering the extent of
the United States, and the small number of judges, is too
burdensome.77
They further noted that "some of the present judges do not enjoy health and
strength of body sufficient to enable them to undergo the toilsome journeys." 78
District judges encountered similar difficulties in juggling their circuit and
district court responsibilities. In the period between 1789 and 1797, the district
courts tried few cases, with the busiest district, New York, trying 269 cases.
79
However, judges found more than their share of work at the circuit level,
wherein more than three-thousand cases were tried during the same period.80
The district and circuit courts met in different locations throughout the states,
often with little travel time between sessions. 8 Despite these challenges,
Congress foisted other responsibilities on district and circuit courts, such as
conducting naturalization proceedings.
82
In this environment, the loss of one district judge would halt any cases from
being heard in a state's district court and could lead to congestion in the
circuits as well. Similarly, in riding the circuits, Supreme Court Justices
traveled thousands of miles and the loss of any one Justice thrust additional
burdens on the others.83  It is in such an environment that the RecessAppointments Clause must be understood. To keep in place the structure,
judges, to appellate jurisdiction." Id. By 1792, two Justices (Jay and Johnson) had resigned, at
least in part, because of the burdens of circuit riding. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT 19 (1993). For a detailed discussion of circuit riding, see FELIX FRANKFURTER
& JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 14-55 (1928).
77. 1 AM. STATE PAPERS MIsC. 52, 52 No. 32 (1792).
78. Id. But see David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1711-12 (2007) (arguing that circuit riding should be reinstituted because it
made Justices more accessible to the public, yielding a "relationship of camaraderie and respect
between the Justices and local citizens, judges, and members of the bar" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
79. HENDERSON, supra note 60, at 62.
80. Id. at 72. Of the cases tried by the circuit courts, 2847 were civil common-law cases.
Id. at 73.
81. Id. at 44-45 ("[T]he district and circuit courts in nine states met at two locations, in
three states at three locations, and in Kentucky at a single location.").
82. Id. at 48.
83. See id. at 42. In 1790, Justice Iredell rode 1900 miles on the Southern circuit and 1800
miles to and from Philadelphia. Id. By 1838, when the circuits had expanded to nine, Justice
McKinley reported traveling 10,000 miles in one year. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 76,
at 49.
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stability, and efficiency of the judiciary, it was essential that the president be
able to act immediately to "fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate."
84
III. THE CONTEMPORARY JUDICIARY
The twenty-first century judiciary is very different from that which was put
in place by the First Congress. Today's judiciary includes many more judges,
circuits, and districts. 85 Each court has distinct functions, and active judges sit
86on just one court at a time. Additionally, improved transportation and the
position of "senior judge" allows courts to better adapt to the increased
caseloads that accompany deaths, resignations, and unexpected influxes of
cases.8 7 These distinct aspects of the contemporary federal judiciary alter the
necessity of applying the Recess Appointments Clause to Article III vacancies.
The framework of the Judiciary Act of 1789 remained in place for more than
a century.88  However, during this time, developments in America required
some minor adjustments to this structure. America was growing in size and
the federal judiciary had evolved into a highly professional organization,
necessitating a more formal and tiered review process. 89  Thus, Congress
reorganized the United States circuit court system into nine circuits, expanded
the Supreme Court to nine Justices, 90 and then created the position of circuit
judge. Nonetheless, United States circuit courts continued to exercise
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
85. But see David L. Cook et al., Criminal Caseloads in US. District Courts: More than
Meets the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1579, 1581 (1995) (arguing that even though there are more
district judges and their caseloads are not increasing statistically, the notion of judicial workload
is not adequately reflected by measuring case filings; for example, today's federal courts see
many more drug distribution cases than drug possession cases, and distribution cases tend to
require more time and work from judges).
86. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685, 715 (2000).
87. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
88. Eric J. Gribbin, Note, California Split: A Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit, 47 DUKE L.J.
351, 371 (1997) ("One hundred twenty-two years after the first Judiciary Act, the federal courts
were restructured into a form which has basically remained intact to this day.").
89. See William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in
Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
1139, 1150-51 (1996); Carl Tobias, Modern Federal Judicial Selection, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 527,
532 (1999) (reviewing SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997)); Bryan Wright, Note, But What Will
They Do Without Unpublished Opinions?: Some Alternatives for Dealing with the Ninth Circuit's
Massive Caseload Post FR.A.P. 32.1, 7 NEV. L.J. 239, 258-59 (2006). By 1860, there were a
total of thirty-three states and forty-three district court judgeships. Emily Field Van Tassel,
Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service-and Disservice-1 789-1992,
142 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 342 (1993).
90. Judiciary Act of 1837, ch. 34, §§ 1-2, 5 Stat. 176, 176-77.
91. Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45; Philip D. Oliver, Systematic
Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members
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"mixed appellate-trial jurisdiction" and Supreme Court Justices continued to
ride circuit.92 Even those revisions turned out to be insufficient to handle the
growing nation's needs.
In 1891, the Evarts Act, commonly referred to as the "Circuit Courts of
Appeals Act," formally replaced the structure first enunciated by the Judiciary
Act of 1789.93  This Act created nine "circuit courts of appeals," each
consisting of two circuit judges and one district judge.94 With the assignment
of two circuit judges per court, the practice of Supreme Court Justice circuit
riding formally ended.95 These circuit courts of appeals were delegated the
appellate jurisdiction that was previously granted to the United States circuit
courts. 96 This rendered the United States circuit courts all but obsolete and
they were soon thereafter abolished.97  The newly created circuit courts of
appeals were to deal solely with appeals from district courts, and no longer to
conduct trials of their own. 98 America now had a three-tier federal judiciary,
with the district court exercising trial jurisdiction and the other two focused
solely on reviewing those decisions. 99
The system set in place by the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act remains today,
but has been considerably expanded. 00 There are presently thirteen circuits 0 1
of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 833 (1986); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The
Unconventional Conventionalist, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 209, 212 (1999) (reviewing BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)).
92. Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 603 (1989).
93. Circuit Courts of Appeal (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
94. Id. §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. at 826-27.
95. See id.; Cynthia J. Rapp, In Chambers Opinions by Justices of the Supreme Court, 5
GREEN BAG 2D 181, 183 (2002); Glick, supra note 68, at 1755.
96. Circuit Court of Appeals Act § 2, 26 Stat. at 826 ("[T]here is hereby created in each
circuit a circuit court of appeals, which shall consist of three judges, of whom two shall constitute
a quorum, and which shall be a court of record with appellate jurisdiction ....").
97. Under the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act, the U.S. circuit courts could no longer
entertain appeals, because "all appeals by writ of error otherwise, from ... district courts shall
only be subject to review in the Supreme Court of the United States or in the circuit court of
appeals hereby established ...." Id. § 4, 26 Stat. at 827. The U.S. circuit courts were then
abolished in 1911. Act of Nov. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
98. See Circuit Court of Appeals Act § 4, 26 Stat. at 827.
99. See Carl Tobias, Electoral/Judicial Reform: Dear Chief Judge Schroeder, 13 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv. 161, 162 (2002); J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit
Conflicts: A Solution Neededfor a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 913 (1983).
100. See Gribbin, supra note 88, at 371 (noting many of those differences, including the
carving out of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit, and the end of the right of a
second appeal from the courts of appeals to the Supreme Court).
101. Twelve of these are geographic and include the United States Courts of Appeals for the
First through Eleventh Circuits, and the D.C. Circuit. The thirteenth is a specialized court
called the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. United States Courts of Appeals,
http://www.uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
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and ninety-four geographic districts.' ° 2 Over time, the membership of all of
these courts has increased considerably. Today, the courts of appeals are
allotted a total of 178 active circuit judges to serve among the thirteen
circuits.103 The ninety-four district courts are allocated a total of 678 seats to
be filled by active district judges. 0 4  These figures evidence the drastic
changes that the federal judiciary has undergone since the early days of our
nation. No longer does just one judge staff each district.10 5 Although federal
caseloads are admittedly heavy, 1 6 the size of the judiciary prevents the death
or retirement of a single judge from yielding a total shutdown of a court.
Unlike the eighteenth century, the administration of our whole judicial system
is not entrusted to just nineteen men, nor is a judge responsible for duties on
multiple different courts. 10 7  Instead, today's federal judiciary consists of
nearly one thousand active seats, a clear demarcation among the duties of the
different judges, and more tightly confined geographic districts than those
established by the First Congress.
But these figures do not tell the full story. Throughout "the first eight
decades of the federal judiciary, Congress made no provision for the retirement
of Article III judges." 108 Thus, many judges found that for economic reasons,
retirement was not an option. 1° 9 Not only is a retirement package available to
judges today, but § 371 of Title 28 of the United States Code permits judges
who are at least sixty-five years old and have served in the federal judiciary for
at least fifteen years to assume "senior status." 110 Under such an arrangement,
the judge "may retain the office but retire from regular active service after
102. These include at least one in each state, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico. U.S. Courts, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
103. 28 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); see also Total Judicial Officers Table,
supra note 71 (citing numbers of circuit judges from 1990 to 2006).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also Total Judicial Officers Table,
supra note 71.
105. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
106. In 2005, each circuit judge signed an average of fifty-two written opinions per year.
U.S. Court of Appeals, Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2005.pl
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009). During this same year, the 678 district judges averaged 488 filings
each. U.S. District Court, Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd
2005.pl (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
107. George, supra note 67, at 224 (explaining that "[i]n 1911, Congress took the last step
toward establishing the modem intermediate appellate system" by establishing the circuit courts
of appeals and granting each at least three permanent circuit judges).
108. Van Tassel, supra note 89, at 395.
109. Id. ("Aged judges were forced to choose between resigning from the bench and losing
their salary, or continuing in office (often despite incapacity) in order to retain financial
support.").
110. 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2000). A judge needs one less year of service for each year of age
over sixty-five. For example, a sixty-six year old judge need only serve fourteen years of service
before being eligible for senior status. Id.
[Vol. 58:751
A Call to End Recess Appointments for Article III Courts
attaining the age and meeting the service requirements." '  Thus, judges may
retire without actually having to leave the bench. In so doing, the judge's seat
technically becomes "vacant" and a new candidate may be appointed to fill the
seat.112 The retired judge can then continue to "perform such judicial duties as
he is willing and able to undertake," without being counted toward his court's
seat quota. 1
This arrangement has essentially become the norm for federal judges. 14 In
2006, 414 district and court of appeals judges were on senior status.' 15
Although many of these judges take reduced caseloads, they have proven to be
a valuable resource to the federal judiciary by sitting on other courts as visiting
judges and assisting the active members of their court in handling increased
caseloads.11 6 Title 28 permits both circuit and district senior judges to sit by
designation on courts of appeals." 17 Thus, when a circuit is experiencing an
unusually heavy caseload or has recently lost some active judges, it may ask
111. Id. § 371(b)(1); see also id. § 294(b) ("Any judge of the United States who has retired
from regular active service under section 371(b) or 372(a) of this title shall be known and
designated as a senior judge and may continue to perform such judicial duties as he is willing and
able to undertake, when designated and assigned .... "); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial
Independence: The Selection and Tenure ofArticle III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 993 (2007) ("In
the twentieth century, it became possible for federal judges to retire from full service without
resigning by taking 'senior status."').
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(d) ("The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, a successor to ajustice or judge who retires under this section.").
113. Id. § 294(b).
114. See Van Tassel, supra note 89, at 399 (indicating that federal judges overwhelmingly
opt for senior status rather than retirement when they become eligible).
115. Among these judges, 103 were senior circuitjudges and 311 were senior districtjudges.
Total Judicial Officers Table, supra note 71. These judges often compose a large percentage of
each of their court's total judges. For example, the "total number of authorized judgeships in the
Article II courts in 2005 was approximately 870, and the number of serving Article III judges,
which includes 'Senior Judges' in the inferior federal courts, was over 1200." Jackson, supra
note 11l, at 1014 (footnote omitted); see also Gregory S. Fisher, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: A
Brief Summary of New Congressional Action to Split the Ninth Circuit Court, ALASKA BAR RAG,
May-June 2003, at 9 (reporting that, in 2003, the largest circuit, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, had twenty-one senior judges serving alongside the circuit's twenty-five active judges).
116. These judges have discretion over the size of their caseload. Russell R. Wheeler &
Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1166-67 (2007);
Benjamin G. Shatz & Judge George P. Schiavelli, Barristers Tips: Judges, Justices, Magistrates,
and Commissioners, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2005, at 10. These judges perform a key role in assisting
judges on their courts and elsewhere. See Statement by Judith Resnick, Arthur Liman Professor
of Law, Yale Law School, to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (Apr. 24, 1998), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/hearings/newyork/
0427res.htm; see also Cook, supra note 85, at 1582 n.28 ("[T]he work performed by senior
judges tends to offset the vacancy rate .... ").
117. 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (authorizing circuit judges to sit on other circuits); id § 292(a)
(authorizing district judges to sit on courts of appeals); id. § 294(d) (permitting senior judges to
sit by designation on panels outside of their circuits).
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senior circuit or district court judges to sit on panels.11 8 This arrangement
provides the judiciary with the flexibility and means to respond to changes as
they happen.
The federal judiciary's flexibility is heightened by the abilities of active
district and circuit judges to step into each other's shoes when duty so calls.
Through congressional authorization of inter- and intra-district transfers,
demarcation between district and circuit judges has become less rigid.
Congress has authorized the chief judge of each circuit to temporarily
designate a district judge to fill a circuit court position, or for a circuit judge to
fill any district court position within the circuit's bounds." 9 Further, the chief
judge may shuffle active judges from one district within her circuit to another
in order to handle increased caseloads in that district, temporarily cope with the
loss of a judge, or meet any other goal that is "in the public interest." 20 Lastly,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may temporarily move active district
and circuit judges from one circuit to another "upon presentation of a
certificate of necessity by the chief judge or circuit justice of the circuit
wherein the need arises.' 12 1 Consequently, senior judges and transfers serve as
valuable resources for coping with the sudden need for more judges on a
particular court.
In addition to differences between the structure of today's judiciary and the
one envisioned by the Framers, technological advancements relating to
communication and transportation increase the federal judiciary's ability to
handle sudden vacancies. The Framers designed our Constitution in days
predating the telegraph, at a time when the horse was the most common mode
of transportation.f 22 These obstacles made it difficult to quickly coordinate
118. Specifically, § 294(d) provides:
The Chief Justice of the United States shall maintain a roster of retired judges of the
United States who are willing and able to undertake special judicial duties from time to
time outside their own circuit .... Any such retired judge of the United States may be
designated and assigned by the Chief Justice to perform such judicial duties as he is
willing and able to undertake in a court outside his own circuit.
Id. § 294(d).
119. Id. §§ 291(b), 292(a).
120. See id § 292(b).
121. Id. § 292(d) (This section only applies to district judges.). Under § 291(a), the circuit-
judge corollary, such a certificate of necessity may not even be necessary to temporarily move a
circuit judge to another circuit. Id. § 291(a). Rather, all that is required is that it be "in the public
interest." Id. ("The Chief Justice of the United States may, in the public interest, designate and
assign temporarily any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another circuit upon request by the
chiefjudge or circuit justice of such circuit.").
122. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 63-64 (1854) ("[T]he practicability and great
utility of the invention was fully established by the telegraph constructed under the
superintendence of Morse, by means of an appropriation made by the Congress of the United
States for the purpose, and put in operation between the cities of Washington and Baltimore, in
the year 1844."); THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA 213 (David Crystal ed., 2d ed. 1994) (The
automobile was not invented until 1886.).
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and execute the shifting of judges throughout the judicial structure.12
3
Recognizing the need for filling vacancies without delay, Congress enacted the
Recess Appointments Clause as a reasonable compromise to an administrative
headache. Today, by contrast, judges can fly from one part of the country to
another in a matter of hours. The Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit can notify
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of his urgent need for more judges, and
he can contact the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit minutes later. The quick
flow of communication and the availability of rapid modes of transportation
permit the judiciary to respond effectively to what would have been
insurmountable challenges at the time of our nation's founding.'
24
The increased lifespan and tenure of judges also make urgent vacancies less
frequent. Of the judges who joined the federal bench between 1789 and 1809,
the average Supreme Court Justice served for only fourteen years and the
average lower court judge for sixteen.1 25 This was partially a function of short
lifespan, as judges typically died in their mid-sixties. 126 However, early judges
also expressed higher instances of job dissatisfaction and often left the bench
for private practice. 12 7  Today, by contrast, judges live and serve longer.
Among federal judges whose service terminated between 1983 and 2003, they
averaged twenty-four years of service. 128 On average, lower court judges lived
to seventy-five and Supreme Court Justices lived to eighty-eight years of
age.129 Very rarely do judges resign from their posts altogether; instead they
assume senior status and remain on the bench. 130  In fact, contingent
123. Jeffrey L. Rensberger, The Amount in Controversy: Understanding the Rules of
Aggregation, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 925, 936 (1994) (in the nineteenth century "transportation to a
remote appellate court was difficult").
124. Cf Rhode Island v. Byrne, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 163, at *2 (Nov. 5, 2007) ("Modem
society is mesmerized by... technological innovations not imagined when the framers put quill
to parchment.").
125. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 618 chart 4 (2005).
126. The average lower court judge died at age sixty-four and the average Supreme Court
Justice at sixty-seven. Id.
127. Van Tassel, supra note 89, at 346 ("The highest departure rate for reasons other than
health or age (32%) occurred during the decade when the judiciary was at its smallest: 1789-
1799.").
128. This number is the same for Supreme Court Justices and judges of the lower federal
courts alike. Resnik, supra note 125, at 618 chart 4.
129. Id.
130. See Van Tassel, supra note 89, at 399 ("Of the 211 judges who chose to reduce their
workload once they became eligible to do so, [only] 7% resigned completely."); see also Resnik,
supra note 125, at 619 ("[J]udges understand the heavy workload of their colleagues, and while
many take 'senior status,' they continue to shoulder a large proportion of the work."); Arnold H.
Lubasch, At Retirement Age, Federal Judges Choose to Help Reduce Court's Caseload, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987, at 48 ("Judge Pollack is one of 15 senior judges on the [S.D.N.Y.] court,
judges who have reached retirement age and have taken senior status .... They contribute their
experience to reduce the heavy caseload of the court.").
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retirements have become quite common.131  In these situations, the judge
specifies the conditions under which she will resign, often requiring the
nomination or confirmation of a judge to fill her seat. 132 Thus, not only do
judges serve longer, but fewer of their vacancies result from sudden
resignations. 133 Seats remain occupied longer, typically only becoming vacant
after the president and Congress have had an opportunity to consider potential
candidates for lifetime appointments. 34 Chief judges of each of the respective
courts can better anticipate vacancies, thus permitting them to plan methods for
coping with such a loss by utilizing transfers or shifting cases from one judge
to another.
It is in this contemporary context that the Recess Appointments Clause
should be understood. Today's judiciary is of a much larger size than that
created in 1789.135 It no longer relies on just one judge per district or judges
serving on multiple courts at a time, but rather a large system of tiered
review.1 36  Today's federal judiciary, with its access to instantaneous
communication, quick transportation, large pools of senior judges, longer
judicial tenure, and mechanisms for transferring judges, provides much more
131. See Madden, supra note 1, at 1155 (noting the "increasingly common" practice of
prospective and contingent retirements). The most recent high profile contingent vacancy was
that of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Her resignation letter specified that her
retirement would commence once a successor to her seat was confirmed. Letter from Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor to President George W. Bush (July 1, 2005), http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/publicinfo/press/oconnor07OlO5.pdf. Justice Samuel Alito was confirmed by a fifty-
eight to forty-two vote and replaced Justice O'Connor on January 31, 2006. Robert Cohen, Alito
Joins Supreme Court After Partisan Senate Vote, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 1, 2006, at
1; Adam Liptak, Alito Vote May Be Decisive in Marquee Cases this Term, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2006, at Al.
132. See Madden, supra note 1, at 1155 (discussing the implications of the "increasingly
common practice of life-tenured judges making prospective retirements-anticipated on a future
date certain or contingent upon the confirmation, appointment, or qualification of a successor").
133. See Van Tassel, supra note 89, at 349 ("The resignation rate steadily declined from 8%
in the 1920s to 4% in the 1940s.... [I]t has fluctuated only slightly since the 1940s .... ").
134. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Parties Gear Up for High Court Battle, WASH. POST, June 27,
2005, at A2 ("Rehnquist, 80, has thyroid cancer, and many officials, jurists and activists believe
he will step down after the court's current term ends today. . . . The White House has been
preparing for a nomination for four years and almost certainly would be ready to announce a
choice right away."); Jan Crawford Greenburg, 2 to Watch for Vacancy Have Much in Common,
CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2005, at Al ("Federal appeals court Judges J. Michael Luttig and John
Roberts have emerged as two of the leading contenders to take over the center seat of the U.S.
Supreme Court if Chief Justice William Rehnquist should retire."); see also Madden, supra note
1, at 1147 (contending that the practice of contingent retirement "permits the President to
'prenominate' and the Senate to 'preconfirm' individuals for offices that are not vacant, and then
for the President to appoint any prenominated, preconfirmed individual once the office becomes
available").
135. See supra notes 103-04, 115, and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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flexibility than that put in place by the First Congress.' 37 These realities lend a
foundation on which to view the Recess Appointments Clause.
IV. FULFILLING THE CLAUSE'S PURPOSES
The Recess Appointments Clause undoubtedly fulfilled a crucial function
early in American history. With only one judge per district and the shared
responsibilities of district judges and Supreme Court Justices, the death or
resignation of any one judge could lead to a catastrophic breakdown in the
business of the federal judiciary.138  Such a concern was of paramount
importance to the Framers, as reflected by Alexander Hamilton's explanation
that should a vacancy happen during the recess of the Senate, it "might be
necessary for the public service to fill [it] without delay."' 39 Thus, in such a
circumstance, the president may grant a temporary commission without
seeking the advice and consent of the Senate.14  The question becomes: does
this same necessity still exist today? If not, should the Recess Appointments
Clause still be applied to the federal judiciary, or with its underlying purpose
eliminated, should other constitutional provisions be given more weight?
Most arguments in favor of applying the Recess Appointments Clause to
vacancies in the federal judiciary in some way revolve around the notions of
"governmental necessity" and the "public good." 14 1 In 1823, Attorney General
William Wirt142 penned the first official executive branch evaluation of the
Recess Appointments Clause.1 43 In his analysis of the Clause, he outlined the
Framers' reasons for vesting the power to make recess appointments solely in
the hands of the president. He explained that in the event of a vacancy, the
"office may be an important one; the vacancy may paralyze a whole line of
action in some essential branch of our internal police." 1 4 With these concerns
in mind, he explained that "the public interests may imperiously demand that it
shall be immediately filled." Subsequent commentators have reiterated
these rationales behind the Clause, and agreed that exigency and the public
interest were of utmost concern to the Framers. For example, a note by
Thomas A. Curtis, which was cited extensively in the Ninth Circuit's recess
137. See supra notes 108-34 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Hamilton), supra note 9, at 455.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
141. See infra note 148.
142. Attorney General Wirt served during the Monroe and Adams Administrations from
1817 to 1829. James M. O'Fallon, The Frank Nash Inaugural Lecture-Under Construction: The
Constitution and the Missouri Controversy, 77 OR. L. REV. 381, 384 (1998).
143. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631, 631 (1823) ("The question . . . is, 'whether, under the
constitution, you can fill the vacancy by a commission to expire at the end of the next session?').
144. Id. at 632.
145. Id.
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appointment case of United States v. Woodley, 146 identifies the "main purpose"
of the Recess Appointments Clause as serving to "promote government
continuity and effectiveness by ensuring that important federal offices would
not remain vacant." 147 Courts and commentators have repeated these as being
the underlying purposes of the Clause time and time again.
148
Nonetheless, while paying lip service to the Framers' reasoning behind the
Recess Appointments Clause, courts and scholars have all but brushed aside
the underlying rationale of the Clause in favor of arguments centered on
historical practice and textual construction.' 49 In so doing, the functionality of
the Clause is lost. This reliance on historical practice stems from a
fundamental misunderstanding of the role of history in constitutional
interpretation. The practices of early presidents and Congresses are certainly
useful in ascertaining the Framers' intent for certain constitutional
provisions.' 50  What differs with the Recess Appointments Clause is that the
Federalist Papers, courts, executive branch officials, and commentators have
already recognized the intent behind the Clause. 151 The problem moves from
146. 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (permitting a recess appointee to preside over a
defendant's trial). The dissent cited Mr. Curtis's note a total of twelve times. Id. at 1014-32
(Norris, J., dissenting).
147. Curtis, supra note 6, at 1768.
148. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hat we
understand to be the main purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause [is] to enable the President
to fill vacancies to assure the proper functioning of our government ...."); Woodley, 751 F.2d at
1013 (explaining the "apparent purpose of recess clause 'was to assure the President the capacity
for filling vacancies at any time to keep the Government running smoothly"' (quoting Note,
Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court-Constitutional But Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. REv. 124,
126 (1957)); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1962) ("That purpose, the
appellee urges, is to 'prevent prolonged vacancies in offices whose functions [are] necessary to
the efficient and continued work of the government."' (alteration in original)); Hartnett, supra
note 15, at 401 (emphasizing that Attorney General Wirt's analysis "focused on the purpose of
the Recess Appointment Clause").
149. See, e.g., Evans, 387 F.3d at 1222-23 ("We focus mainly on what the Constitution says
and does not say. The text of the United States Constitution authorizes recess appointments of
judges to Article III courts .... History unites with our reading to support our conclusion.");
Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1010 ("Woodley also argues that there is no historical evidence that the
Framers intended the recess provision to apply to the judiciary. This argument is not only refuted
by the express language of the recess clause, which, as previously noted, refers to all vacancies,
but it is also refuted by legislative history, as well as historical practice, consensus, and
acquiescence."); Hartnett, supra note 15, at 428 (noting that "every President from James Polk
through Lyndon Johnson [made recess appointments to Article III courts], including such diverse
presidents as Buchanan and Lincoln"); Rappaport, supra note 26, at 1487, 1506-38 (discussing
the purpose, structure, and history of the Clause, but only in terms of whether the "original
meaning" of the Clause intended for it to apply to intrasession vacancies and vacancies that arose
pre-recess).
150. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 385-86 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he practice of the early Congresses can provide valuable insight into the
Framers' understanding of the Constitution.").
151. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58:751
2009] A Call to End Recess Appointments for Article III Courts 771
one of ascertaining intent to applying that intent. With the purposes behind the
Clause already articulated, arguments based on George Washington and John
Adams's use of the Clause ignore the more salient issue: is the Clause being
applied today in a way that furthers its defined purposes?
Against the Framers' concern for the timely filling of vacancies, the
independence of the federal judiciary should be considered. Alexander
Hamilton argued that the federal judiciary would remain the "least dangerous"
branch to constitutional liberties, but only "so long as the judiciary remains
truly distinct from both the legislature and executive."'1 52  The Framers
considered it of utmost importance to insulate the federal judiciary from the
influence of the other branches. 153 In order to do so, the Framers granted
lifetime tenure and salary to members of the federal bench. 154 They sought to
prevent the president from having dominance over the appointment process by
mandating that federal judges were to be appointed "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate. ' 55 Thus, the Recess Appointments Clause was
intended to function as a limited exception to the general requirement for
advice and consent, reserved for those offices that "might be necessary for the
public service to fill without delay."' 156  This alternative to the typical
appointment process could unduly influence recess appointments because it
gives the president complete discretion in appointing members to the federal
judiciary and may plant concern in the heads of recess appointees for how
decisions made during interim apointments might affect their chances at a
subsequent lifetime appointment. While these downsides are legitimate, the
Framers had to weigh them against what was then a real and present danger:
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton), supra note 9, at 522-23; see also N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982) (plurality opinion) (noting that by
"assigning the judicial power of the United States to courts [Article III] insulated [the judiciary]
from Legislative or Executive interference").
153. Alexander Hamilton emphasized the importance of an independent judiciary by saying,
"from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered,
awed or influenced by its coordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its
firmness and independence, as permanency in office." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton),
supra note 9, at 523; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Officers during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
155. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 67 (Hamilton), supra note 9, at 455.
157. Note, Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court-Constitutional But Unwise?, 10
STAN. L. REv. 124, 140 (1957) [hereinafter SCOTUS Recess Appointments] (explaining that at the
time of Chief Justice Warren's recess appointment, one commentator "feared the effect, in terms
of judicial independence, of a Justice sitting on the Court 'with one eye over his shoulder on
Congress"'). For a discussion of Supreme Court nominees who were not confirmed by the
Senate, including recess appointees such as John Rutledge and Roger B. Taney, see Henry B.
Hogue, Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2001, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 1.
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the breakdown of the federal court system stemming from the loss of a single
judge. With regard to the contemporary judiciary, that danger has been
eliminated, and thus a new examination of the Recess Appointments Clause is
warranted. Such an examination should view the Clause in light of its
underlying purpose.
Instead of blindly relying on historical practices without considering the
reasoning that influenced those practices, a more pragmatic approach should be
utilized when examining the Recess Appointments Clause. A "living
Constitution" approach accomplishes that goal by interpreting the Constitution
in light of the current environment and needs. 158 Under such an approach, the
text is "informed by considerations of structure and purpose. As a result, the
same words mean something different in the different settings." 159 This view
takes into account the Constitution's ability to adapt to changing
circumstances, rather than allowing "outworn interpretations to strangle the
nation's growth."' 160  Today, a vacancy in a federal court does not yield the
drastic ramifications that were of undeniable concern to the Framers. No
longer are whole districts delegated to just one judge, nor do judges need to
juggle responsibilities between their own court and their duties on circuit
courts. 161 Instead, a complex federal judiciary has been created with distinct
responsibilities.162 Even when a court is overwhelmed with cases, devices not
available early in our nation's history have come to play an important role in
managing the federal judiciary. Senior judges, transfers, and technology have
made the loss of a judge a far less tragic matter.16 3
It is in this context that the purposes behind the Constitution should be
analyzed. To do justice to the Constitution is to interpret it in light of its
purpose and aims.' 64  Those purposes are no longer met by the present
application of the Recess Appointments Clause to vacancies in the federal
judiciary. In fact, as the next section indicates, recent events have made it
158. The living Constitution approach has come under criticism, most notably from Justice
Antonin Scalia. He contends that "[t]he Constitution is not an organism . . . it is a legal
document." Tom Kertscher, Justice Draws Overflow Crowd, Protestors at Marquette,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 2001, at BI. However, the living Constitution approach has in
the past found support among other members of the Court. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 307 (1980) (Powell, J. dissenting) ("We are construing a living Constitution."). The
application of this approach to the Recess Appointments Clause has recently been advocated by
Professor Michael Herz. Herz, supra note 4, at 453.
159. Herz, supra note 4, at 453.
160. Reich, supra note 45, at 749.
161. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text.
164. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819) ("[W]e must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding ... a constitution, intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.").
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clearer than ever that the Clause has become a burden, not a benefit, to the
orderly administration of government.
V. THE SENATE'S RESPONSE
A. Growing Tension Between the President and Senate
The scope of the Recess Appointments Clause is still a subject of heated
debate. 6 5 The most recent case dealing with the Clause was the 2004 case of
Evans v. Stephens.16 6  There, the judges of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the recess appointment of their colleague, Judge William H.
Pryor. 167 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Justice Stevens engaged in
the infrequent practice of drafting a concurrence to the denial of certiorari in
which he took pause to note that this case "raises significant constitutional
questions regarding the President's intrasession appointment" of Judge
Pryor.168 He explained that certain facts of this case made it atypical, and thus
not warranting review, including the fact that petitioners sought review of an
interlocutory order and that the case was confined to a rather infrequent
practice: the intrasession appointment of an Article III judge. 169 Nonetheless,
Justice Stevens cautioned, "it would be a mistake to assume that our
disposition of this petition constitutes a decision on the merits," leaving open
the question of whether certain recess appointments to the federal judiciary are
in fact constitutional.
170
The debate about the application of the Recess Appointments Clause to
Article III vacancies has been more than academic. Presidents have
encountered significant resistance from the Senate in which lawmakers have
cautioned that such a practice does not in fact promote the public welfare. 71
For the majority of our nation's history, the presidential process of filling
165. In fact, while the subject was rarely discussed for the first 200 years of our nation's
history, it has undergone a resurgence and heavy scholarly analysis over the past decade. Among
these are many law journal articles (including several pieces in a recent symposium by the
Cardozo Law Review) and congressional reports. See, e.g., FISHER, FEDERAL RECESS JUDGES,
supra note 30, at 3-4; HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RECESS APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, JANUARY 20, 2001 - OCTOBER
31, 2008, at 1-17 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL333I0.pdf; Symposium,
Jurocracy and Distrust: Reconsidering the Federal Judicial Appointments Process, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 331 (2005) (providing eleven articles on the topic of federal judicial appointments).
166. 387 F.3d 1220 (1 1th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942 (2005).
167. Id. at 1222. President George W. Bush appointed Judge Pryor to the bench on February
20, 2004, while Congress was on an eleven-day recess. Id. at 1221; see also Fletcher & Dewar,
supra note 13; Neil A. Lewis, Bypassing Senate for Second Time, Bush Seats Judge, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2004, at Al.
168. Evans v. Stephens, 544 U.S. 942, 942 (2005).
169. Id. at 943.
170. Id.
171. E.g., 106 CONG. REC. 12,761 (1960) (statement of Sen. Hart).
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vacancies on Article III courts with recess appointees went more or less
unchallenged by Congress. In justifying the president's power to make
temporary appointments to Article III courts, advocates of such an expansive
view of the Recess Appointments Clause point heavily to this "historical
acquiescence" by the Senate.1 73  However, as the structure of the federal
judiciary changed, recess appointments began to come under scrutiny. In
1960, just a few years after President Eisenhower's recess appointments of
Justices Warren, Brennan, and Stewart to the Supreme Court, 17 4 the Senate
passed a resolution requesting that recess appointments to the Supreme Court
be avoided "except under most unusual and urgent circumstances."' 175  This
resolution asserted that such appointments may not be "wholly consistent"
with the needs of the citizens of the United States.
1 76
In the coming decades, recess appointments continued to be a popular source
of discussion in the Senate, most often focusing on appointments made during
intrasession recesses or those involving federal judges. 77 In fact, during the
Reagan administration, Senate Democrats retaliated against the president's use
of recess appointments by holding up the confirmation of hundreds of
presidential nominees, only relenting once "the White House agreed to give the
Senate advance notice of all future recess appointments."'' 78 Thus, rather than
172. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(stating that "[tihe Legislative Branch has consistently confirmed judicial recess appointees
without dissent"); Rappaport, supra note 26, at 1576 (describing recess appointments as a "long-
standing practice"); SCOTUS Recess Appointments, supra note 157, at 132.
173. See Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1011-12; Curtis, supra note 6, at 1785-86.
174. FISHER, FEDERAL RECESS JUDGES, supra note 30, at 4; Fisher, Recess Appointments,
supra note 6, at 141; Jackson, supra note 11, at 975.
175. 106 CONG. REC. 18,145 (1960) (passing the resolution by a vote of forty-eight to thirty-
seven, with fifteen senators not voting). During debate of the resolution, Senator Hart argued that
recess appointments "should not be made except under unusual circumstances and for the
purposes of preventing or ending a demonstrable breakdown in the administration of the Court's
business." Id. at 18,130. Then in 1985, Senator Proxmire explained that the Senate's concern
was "that a sitting Justice was placed in a most difficult position since he or she participated in
judicial decisions but without the protections afforded by the lifetime appointment status of the
other Justices." 131 CONG. REC. 17,623-24 (1985) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). For a more
detailed discussion of the Senate debates, see Hartnett, supra note 15, at 433-35.
176. 106 CONG. REC. 12,761.
177. See 150 CoNG. REC. 2919 (2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The President says that he
wants judges who will 'follow the law' and complains about what he calls 'judicial activism.'
Yet, he has acted-with disregard for the constitutional balance of powers and the Senate's
advice and consent authority .... "); 131 CONG. REC. 22,419 (1985) (Senator Byrd and a number
of democratic Senators sponsored a resolution, S. Res. 213, condemning appointments made
during short intrasession recesses.).
178. 41 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC: 99th Congress, 1st Session 1985, at 418
(1986); see also Fisher, Recess Appointments, supra note 6, at 134 ("Confrontations over recess
appointments in the 1980s and 1990s led to political agreement between the executive and
legislative branches .... [Presidents] recognized that excessive use of this power could trigger
credible threats from Senators to place a hold on all nominations ... ").
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recess appointments promoting the orderly administration of government, their
use resulted in a turf war whereby the confirmation process was actually
stifled. Despite massive opposition to the liberal use of power granted under
the Clause, the executive branch has used the Clause vigorously, often to fill
important positions with controversial nominees.'
79
B. The Thanksgiving and Christmas "Pro Forma" Sessions
This controversy came to a head during the presidency of George W. Bush.
In the span between President Bush's inauguration in 2001 and June 2007, he
made a total of 171 recess appointments, 141 of which were made during
intrasession recesses averaging only twenty-five days.' Two of these recess
appointments were made to Article III courts-both of which were circuit
court vacancies that the president used his power to fill in early 2004.181 The
recess appointees were Judge Charles W. Pickering, who filled a vacancy on
the Fifth Circuit, and Judge William H. Pryor, who went to the Eleventh
Circuit. 182 Senate Democrats expressed particular dissatisfaction with these
two appointments and reached an agreement with the president on May 18,
2004, wherein they assured floor votes on twenty-five nominees in exchange
for the president's pledge not to make any further recess appointees to the
federal judiciary for the remainder of the 108th Congress. 183 This bargain was
limited to federal judicial vacancies, so President Bush continued to use the
Recess Appointments Clause to fill vacancies in other offices.
18 4
Over the next few years, Democrats in Congress continued to express their
dissatisfaction with the president's routine use of intrasession recesses to
appoint nominees to influential positions, often by reference to the recess
appointments to the federal judiciary by President Bush in 2004. For example,
on the Senate floor in 2007, Senator Feinfold (D-Wis.) attacked President
Bush for "not act[ing] in a bipartisan way." 85 He referred to the president's
past recess appointment of Judge Pickering as "a further slap to this
179. See 153 CONG. REC. S13,243 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("President Bush had previously used a recess appointment to put Charles Pickering on the bench,
after his nomination was voted down by the Judiciary Committee in 2002. President Bush
announced that appointment, as I recall, on the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend in 2004
.... 1 .).
180. HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 165, at 2-3, 7.
181. FISHER, FEDERAL RECESS JUDGES, supra note 30, at 6.
182. Judge Pickering was appointed in January and Judge Pryor in February. Id.
183. Id.; Helen Dewar, President, Senate Reach Pact on Judicial Nominations, WASH. POST,
May 19, 2004, at A21.
184. Dewar, supra note 183 (noting that roughly seventy non-judicial appointments were tied
up for other reasons). In fact, the Senate adjourned for a ten-day recess just three days after
reaching its agreement with the president. Twelve recess appointments were made during that
recess. HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 165, at 9 (not distinguishing between judicial and non-
judicial appointments).
185. 153 CONG. REc. S 13,289 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2007) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
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institution." 186 Other senators, such as Senator Leahy (D-Vt.) have echoed
these remarks, contesting that Judge Pryor's appointment is indicative of "the
very problem with recess appointments of controversial judges."', 87 Although
senators made known their distaste for the president's past use of the Recess
Appointments Clause, by the fall of 2007 they were still unable to get the
president's assurance that he would not fill crucial positions with recess
appointees. 188 Thus, the Senate took action. With the Thanksgiving Recess
approaching, the Senate Democrats feared that the president would see this
short break as an opportunity to use his recess appointment power to
circumvent the Senate's advice and consent role.' s9 Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid (D-Nev.) "asked a few Democratic senators who plan[ned] to be
close to the capital during the holidays ... to gavel open and shut the Senate
for two days each week."190 This resulted in a series of "pro forma" sessions
lasting only a minute or two, held during the Thanksgiving Recess.' 91 By
employing this formalism, the Senate was still technically "in session," thus
eliminating the president's recess appointment power. 19 2 Amid more debates
over nominees, the Senate again employed pro forma sessions over the
Christmas Winter Break.1 93
Both series of pro forma sessions largely related to controversial executive
appointments, 194 but speak generally to the problems underlying the expansive
construction given to the Recess Appointments Clause. No longer is there
broad congressional acquiescence. In fact, Congress has made its distaste for
Article III recess appointments expressly known. When these events are
186. Id.
187. 151 CONG. REC. S6282 (daily ed. June 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
188. See Levey, supra note 47.
189. Specifically, they heard "rumors that Bush might use the recess to appoint Dr. James W.
Holsinger Jr. as U.S. surgeon general." Id.
190. Id.
191. 153 CONG. REC. S14,609 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2007) (statement of Sen. Reid) ("Mr.
President, the Senate will be coming in for pro forma sessions during the Thanksgiving holiday to
prevent recess appointments.").
192. Levey, supra note 47; Zay N. Smith, Stand and Deliver, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008,
at 24.
193. Paul Kane, The Fastest Gavel in the Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2007, at A13; Smith,
supra note 192; Robert J. Spitzer, Op-Ed., The 'Pocket Veto' Peril, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at
A19; Editorial, Nominee is a Stranger to Justice, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 5, 2008,
http://www.sptimes.com/2008/02/05/Opinion/Nominee is stranger-t.shtml.
194. The Thanksgiving sessions stemmed largely from the fear of the recess appointment of a
new surgeon general. Gail Russell Chaddock, Democrats Take Defensive Tack with Bush,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 21, 2007, at 2; Alicia Mundy, Wary Democrats Keep a Light on
at Capitol, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at B3; John Bresnahan, Reid to Bush: No Recess
Appointments Wanted, POLITICO, Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/l 1/16/
politics/politico/thecrypt/main3516002.shtml. The winter sessions centered on concerns about
President Bush appointing a new assistant attorney general. See Bruce Alpert & Bill Walsh, On
the Hill: Landrieu Calls 40-second Session, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 6, 2008, at
A25.
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viewed in conjunction with the structure of the contemporary judiciary, it is
clear that recess appointments to Article III judgeships are no longer necessary
to serve the public interest. With the purpose behind the Clause no longer met,
it should not apply to Article III judgeships. Therefore, the Recess
Appointments Clause should essentially be read out of the Constitution when
examining Article III vacancies. To fulfill the Framers' intent, the emphasis
should instead move to the Constitution's explicit command that federal judges
should be appointed for lifetime tenure, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Such a construction furthers the Framers' goals by providing a
judiciary that functions effectively, whose members have undergone
congressional scrutiny, and that is insulated from political influence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent wars between the president and Senate over the recess
appointment power epitomize the changes between the Framers' intent in
drafting the Recess Appointments Clause and its application today. The
Framers envisioned the Recess Appointments Clause as a way of ensuring the
orderly administration of government and serving the public good. Instead, it
has yielded the opposite result, particularly with respect to the federal
judiciary. It has resulted in Senate resolutions, congressional outrage, and turf
wars among presidents and Congresses. Congressional retaliation has taken
more than one form, including delays in the confirmation procedure, harsh
words about the president's ethics, and the employment of formalistic faux-
congressional sessions. These results are particularly unsettling when
examining the federal judiciary. The Recess Appointments Clause no longer
serves a necessary function because of the judiciary's internal mechanisms for
coping with judicial vacancies. Senior judges and transfers can be utilized to
fill voids in the judiciary, rather than relying on the president's unilateral
appointment of untenured judges. When considered in light of the
Constitution's express interest in permanent, independent judges, it is clear
that the Recess Appointments Clause has outlived its usefulness as applied to
the federal judiciary. Instead, the interests underlying the Advice and Consent
Clause should be considered paramount. By construing the Constitution as a
living document that can mean different things in different contexts, a reading
more in line with the Framers' intent could be adopted. With its purpose no
longer served, future presidents should not be permitted to use this power to
fill vacancies on Article III courts. This does not cast doubt on the recess
appointments by prior presidents, but rather recognizes that different times
necessitate different readings of the Constitution's broad grants of power.
195. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton), supra
note 9, at 523-24.
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